That you'd need 10 to 13 pounds of plutonium.

Now, plutonium, 10 to 13 pounds this. This is enough plutonium to create a Nagasaki size atomic weapon.

The nuclear materials in question are plutonium, uranium, thorium, deuterium, tritium and lithium 6.

Ten reactors that had produced weapons grade plutonium have been shut down.

This is the first time that the plutonium rich carbide fuel has been reprocessed anywhere in the world.

Iran points out that some of the hydrocarbons, such as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, are very toxic.

This includes, in accordance with the IAEA definition, nuclear material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without further adaptation or additional enrichment. This is plutonium containing less than 80 per cent plutonium 238, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and uranium 233.

12. Supports continued efforts by the United States of America and the Russian Federation to implement the 1997 Agreement concerning Cooperation regarding Plutonium Production Reactors and the 2000 Agreement concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defence Purposes and Related Cooperation

Chemical compounds including such material and plutonium in spent fuel elements also belong to this category.

Now you might want to look at plutonium as another fissionable material that you might use in a bomb.

Specific concern was expressed about both the environmental and proliferation risks of plutonium reprocessing and nuclear materials shipments.

Plutonium produced at the remaining three reactors which generate heat and electricity has not been used for nuclear weapons since 1994.

The Savannah River Plant in South Carolina processed the majority of the Pu 238 needed to fuel the three new RTG apos s.

The Chernobyl disaster contaminated the Belarusian territory with long lived caesium, strontium and plutonium radionuclides.

An RTG is a device without moving parts that converts the heat from the decay of the radioisotope Plutonium 238 (Pu 238) into electricity.

In 1994, Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee completed production of all the iridium parts that will be used to encapsulate the Pu 238 fuel.

Third, the States parties should improve control over proliferation of sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, specifically, activities involving uranium enrichment and plutonium separation.

About 121 incidents were reported to the Agency in 2004, some of which involved weapons usable highly enriched uranium or plutonium being smuggled across national borders.

Proposals have been mooted to impose a moratorium on uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, to multilateralize the nuclear fuel cycle or to banish the building of new national fuel cycle facilities.

Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, pressed the initial flight pellets of Pu 238 and welded these pellets into the iridium capsules.

There are many, many sites where warheads are stored and, in fact, lots of sites where fissionable materials, like highly enriched uranium and plutonium, are absolutely not safe.

Mistakes are not limited to reactor sites. Accidents at the Savannah River reprocessing plant released ten times as much radio iodine as the accident at Three Mile Island, and a fire at the Gulf United facility in New York in 1972 scattered an undisclosed amount of plutonium, forcing the plant to shut down permanently.

From 1993 through 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency documented 175 cases of nuclear theft, 18 of which involved highly enriched uranium or plutonium, the key ingredients to make a nuclear weapon.

Meanwhile, with the cooperation of Japan, for the first time, 20 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium, equivalent to two to three nuclear warheads, was successfully disposed of with the aid of advanced technology developed by Russian scientists.

(iv) Commit themselves to expediting agreement on alternatives, consistent with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons principles of the right to peaceful uses and the obligations for non proliferation, to the acquisition of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities

For a number of years, I have advocated the consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, so as to address challenges posed by proliferation sensitive operations such as those related to uranium enrichment and plutonium separation.

One of the alternatives that the report analyses as an incentive for a State to forego the development of its own activities related to the complete nuclear fuel cycle, particularly as concerns enrichment and reprocessing, is to provide assurances of the supply of nuclear fuel based on various options.

We therefore believe that in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons it is crucial to strengthen the supervisory competencies of the IAEA and to control more effectively the stages in the nuclear fuel cycle that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium processing.

For its part, after announcing the cessation of the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons, France decided in February 1996 to close and dismantle its facilities for the production of such materials at Pierrelatte and Marcoule.

Lastly, there should be better controls over operations involving uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing and the disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste they were a veritable Achilles heel of the current non proliferation regime, and should be concentrated in a limited number of regional centres.

Pyongyang violated its obligations under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty by secretly reprocessing enough plutonium to produce two nuclear weapons in the early 1990 s. After it withdrew from a restraining agreement negotiated by the Clinton administration in 1994, it expelled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and began reprocessing spent fuel that could produce another six bombs worth of plutonium.

The indigenously developed unique plutonium rich mixed carbide fuel used in the fast breeder test reactor (FBTR) has performed extremely well, having operated past a burn up of 148,000 megawatt day per tonne (MWd t) without a single fuel pin failure.

In respect of the claimed loss of coral reefs, Iran has provided remote sensing evaluation of changes in the coral reef cover sedimentation rate analysis chemical analysis of heavy metals, TPH and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and a study on coral reef growth bands.

Approximately 44,000 sq. km (21 per cent of the country's surface area) is contaminated with caesium 137 21,000 sq. km (10 per cent of the surface area) is contaminated with strontium 90 and 4,000 sq. km (2 per cent of the surface area) is contaminated with plutonium isotopes.

On 7 9 February 2005, in the spirit of the Group of Eight's Global Partnership, Switzerland organized a conference designed to facilitate the participation of interested States in the decommissioning of the Russian Federation's three remaining plutonium producing nuclear reactors.

The scope of the treaty should provide for a ban on future production of weapons grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons purposes a ban on assistance in or encouragement of production of these materials by other States prohibition of the transfer of fissile material from the civilian to the military cycle for nuclear weapons purposes.

Promote timely agreements to prevent the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation technologies and facilities that respect fully the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as set out in the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including alternatives such as the provision of guaranteed nuclear fuel supplies

Japan committed itself, for the purpose of the Partnership, to make a contribution amounting to a little more than 200 million United States dollars, of which 100 million is to be allocated to the G 8 disposition programme for Russian surplus weapon grade plutonium and the rest to projects for dismantling Russian decommissioned nuclear submarines.

Promote timely agreement to prevent the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation technologies and facilities and seek alternatives that respect fully the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as set out in the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, such as the provision of guaranteed nuclear fuel supplies and other incentives

As mentioned in the first report, Section 152 a of the Penal Code makes it an offence to receive, possess, use, transfer, alter, dispose of or distribute any material consisting of or containing plutonium or uranium without lawful permission and thereby cause a risk of damage to any person's body, health, property or living environment.

Second, while the access of non nuclear weapon States to the benefits of nuclear technology should not be curtailed, we should focus on creating incentives for States to voluntarily forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capacities, while guaranteeing their supply of the fuel necessary to develop peaceful uses.

26. Calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to approach the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out the verification requirements set forth in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement signed by the two States on the basis of the model legal framework that has been agreed on and that is now available to be used in new verification agreements between the Agency and each of the two States

More than two decades ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency caught North Korea violating its safeguards agreement and reprocessing plutonium. After the North renounced the subsequent Agreed Framework, negotiated by President Bill Clinton s administration, in 2003, it expelled IAEA inspectors, withdrew from the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, and has since detonated three nuclear devices and conducted a variety of missile tests.

While some States Parties to the NPT with fuel cycle capabilities under IAEA full scope safeguards have been under extensive pressure and restrictions, non parties to the Treaty with unsafeguarded plutonium reprocessing facilities have free access to any nuclear technology and know how.

After consultation with his staff, Bush responded that, absent a plutonium extraction facility, US intelligence could not confirm that the plant comprised a nuclear weapons program. I told him Olmert I had decided on a diplomatic option backed by force to stop Syria, Bush writes.