No reprocessing or export of spent fuel has ever taken place.

It considered that although significant progress had been made in terms of nuclear safety, the issues of the reprocessing and disposal of nuclear fuel and the dismantling of nuclear plants were far from resolved.

One of the alternatives that the report analyses as an incentive for a State to forego the development of its own activities related to the complete nuclear fuel cycle, particularly as concerns enrichment and reprocessing, is to provide assurances of the supply of nuclear fuel based on various options.

The participation of the largest possible number of States is vital first and foremost the nuclear Powers, but also countries which possess the potential to produce nuclear explosive devices and have uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities.

Political constraints and monopolies in the area of fuel supply and reprocessing prevents developing countries from enjoying their inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and risk the continuous and secure operation of their nuclear power plants.

Pyongyang violated its obligations under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty by secretly reprocessing enough plutonium to produce two nuclear weapons in the early 1990 s. After it withdrew from a restraining agreement negotiated by the Clinton administration in 1994, it expelled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and began reprocessing spent fuel that could produce another six bombs worth of plutonium.

An example of our policy is our joint project with the United States on the safe transportation of fresh highly enriched fuel of the BN 350 reactor and its reprocessing into low grade nuclear material.

The Conference affirms the need to assure a reliable supply of nuclear fuel at reasonable cost to NPT parties that are in compliance with the Treaty and their safeguards obligations, which possess civil nuclear power reactors, and that do not pursue enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

Multilateral nuclear fuel cycle arrangements

While some States Parties to the NPT with fuel cycle capabilities under IAEA full scope safeguards have been under extensive pressure and restrictions, non parties to the Treaty with unsafeguarded plutonium reprocessing facilities have free access to any nuclear technology and know how.

Specific concern was expressed about both the environmental and proliferation risks of plutonium reprocessing and nuclear materials shipments.

This is the conventional nuclear fuel cycle.

Lastly, there should be better controls over operations involving uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing and the disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste they were a veritable Achilles heel of the current non proliferation regime, and should be concentrated in a limited number of regional centres.

Despite their hawkish approach to North Korea s nuclear threats, South Korean officials know that uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing remains only a distant possibility. As a result, they are approaching negotiations skeptically, rather than emphasizing the sense of mutual obligation that should characterize the alliance.

The Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change had urged negotiations without delay on an arrangement, under the IAEA Statute, for the Agency to serve as a guarantor of two fuel cycle related services the supply of fissile material for fuel and the reprocessing of spent fuel.

Hungary was following with interest the ongoing discussion on new multilateral approaches to sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and commended the Director General of IAEA for highlighting the need to discuss the dual uses of certain technologies, such as those related to uranium enrichment and reprocessing.

First, international precedent tells us that nuclear fuel delivery contracts are unreliable, and no legally binding international document or instrument exists to guarantee the delivery of nuclear fuel.

Urges the formulation of guarantees of access to nuclear fuel services, or to fuel itself, subject to appropriate conditions.

urging the formulation of guarantees of access to nuclear fuel services, or to fuel itself, subject to appropriate conditions

Nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies are once again the subject of particular attention from the international community because of their dual use nature.

Solutions to the issue of nuclear submarine fuel can be found.

There is currently an extensive international dialogue on nuclear fuel cycle issue.

Nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies are once again the subject of particular attention from the international community because of their dual use nature (civilian and military).

Clearly, too, I would hope, in the next year or so, to make some progress with regard to establishing better control over the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle, namely, enrichment and reprocessing activities.

The EU believes it is important to encourage access guarantees to nuclear fuel related services or to the fuel itself, under appropriate conditions.

There was no incompatibility between tightening controls over the nuclear fuel cycle and expanding the use of peaceful nuclear technology.

The EU believes it is important to encourage guarantees of access to nuclear fuel related services or to the fuel itself, under appropriate conditions.

My proposal is to create a physical stockpile of LEU at the disposal of the IAEA as a last resort reserve for countries with nuclear power programs that face a supply disruption for non commercial reasons. This would give countries confidence that they can count on reliable supplies of fuel to run their nuclear power plants, and therefore do not need to develop their own uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capability.

a Joint Action with the Russian Federation for the conversion of surplus nuclear weapons material into nuclear fuel for civilian use

The report on possible multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle deserved wide attention.

Uruguay has no nuclear reactors of any kind, hence there is no possibility of diversion or theft of nuclear fuel for subsequent use in producing nuclear devices.

Civilian use of nuclear energy and technology must become fully resistant to proliferation, with better mechanisms for controlling the nuclear fuel cycle.

We welcome early discussion of the report of the IAEA Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and underline the importance of better ensuring that nuclear fuel cycles will be exclusively used for peaceful purposes.

(N.B. this excludes nuclear fuel cycle activities that can be addressed through conventional safeguards arrangements.

It is particularly important to note that the peaceful use of nuclear energy without possession of the nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition.

Third, alternative approaches are being explored to deal with the issue of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Global trends and analysis suggest a lucrative market for the nuclear fuel in the next decade.

Such a framework could include enhanced controls on supply of sensitive technology, strengthened verification and detection in States with such technologies, and internationally guaranteed measures to ensure reliable access to fuel for civil reactors by States that forgo enrichment and reprocessing.

The spread of nuclear technology has exacerbated a long standing tension within the nuclear regime, arising from the simple fact that the technology required for civilian nuclear fuel can also be used to develop nuclear weapons.

The red line is what is done in most nuclear reactors. It's called the open fuel cycle.

developing international and multilateral approaches to manage the risks of fuel production for civilian nuclear power and

Work on revising its guidelines on nuclear power plants, research and fuel cycle facilities is nearing completion.

In the meantime, IAEA should promote practical approaches to ensure the safety of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Our experts are involved actively in the Agency's International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO).

The guaranteed provision of reactor technology and nuclear fuel to users that satisfied agreed non proliferation requirements was clearly a prerequisite for acceptance of any additional controls on the fuel cycle.