The third message is the claim to the veto power.

The proposed language concerning the veto power has already found broad acceptance.

The use of the veto power should be limited and eventually eliminated.

We therefore believe that the veto power should not be extended to new members.

First, we fully support the recommendation of the Secretary General not to expand the veto power.

That creates resentment and mistrust from those who are negatively affected by the abuse of veto power.

The Governor has the power to veto a budget bill, following which the bill is returned to the Legislature, which can either override the Governor's veto by a special majority or reconsider the bill.

In fact, veto power should be given only to the General Assembly, to be exercised by a majority vote.

The leaders affirm the need to restrict the use of the veto power to make it exercisable within narrower limits.

The veto has never allowed the consensus or majority sovereign expression of the Security Council it has served only as a way in which to block the popular will so as to protect the interests of the Power exercising the veto.

That is a central feature of the proposal that would not be mitigated by the suggested moratorium on the exercise of the veto power.

It is against this background that African States adopted the Harare Declaration in 1997, in which they demanded that the veto power be abolished.

The presentations emphasized the difficulties some argued impossibility of reaching consensus on the mechanics of changing the Council's membership and the question of veto power.

The Hamas Veto

Our preference is to limit the use of veto and to promote a veto free culture.

Should 11 countries succeed in obtaining the veto power a prospect that the draft resolution openly envisages it would in practice guarantee the paralysis of the Security Council.

However, in 1997 at Harare, when the African position on enlargement of the Security Council was drafted and adopted, our continent claimed two permanent seats with veto power.

Limiting the Security Council Veto

There should be no extension of the right of veto, and the use of the veto should be limited.

That Position holds that two permanent Security Council seats should be allocated to Africa, with full privileges, including the power of veto, in addition to five non permanent seats.

We collectively maintain that the African continent, which has been underrepresented for so long, deserves two permanent seats with veto power and five non permanent seats on the Council.

Give the sensitivity of this issue the functionality of the system is at stake it is critical for the aspirant countries to clearly state their intentions in pursuing the veto power.

They should have a right of veto.

However, if the veto power is maintained, it is only logical that new permanent member States who join the expanded Security Council must of necessity be accorded the same rights and privileges.

It was also suggested that if a veto is used, an explanation of the reasons for the veto should be given to the Assembly.

The question of the use of the veto

Instead, a veto free culture should be promoted.

(a) Restraint on the use of the veto

Unlike the situation with regard to non permanent Council seats, increasing the number of permanent seats involves sensitive and intricate issues, such as the criteria for selection and eligibility for the veto power.

(f) The question of the use of the veto.

In our view, the veto can rarely be justified.

Sluggish exports mean slow growth, which in turn places limits on social mobility and the expansion of an entrepreneurial middle class. That helps preserve the political power of entrenched veto wielding players, closing the trap.

The IMF reform would have been an important step in updating the allocations of quotas, which determine member states monetary contributions and voting power. The US was not being asked to contribute more money or lose its voting weight, which has always given it a unique veto power.

But our critics say that the AU is not really committed to the veto at all that it does not really want the veto, but something entirely different.

My third point relates to the use of the veto.

Let me briefly deal with the matter of the veto.

We have often reaffirmed that the veto should be eliminated.

This alone justifies referring these issues to the UN General Assembly, which, unlike the Security Council, knows no veto power. A strong declaration and a call for binding measures to address these issues would then be possible.

We have also consistently advocated limiting the use of the veto.

Moreover, we must do away with the right of the veto.

Should the veto be extended to new permanent members or eliminated?

Until the final objective of the elimination of the veto is achieved, as a first step it is necessary to limit the veto to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter.

First, we have since 1945 opposed any extension of the veto right.

Our support is without prejudice to our historical position on the veto.

Some participants urged ending permanent membership and restricting or ending the veto.